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I. INTRODUCTION
Even under the best circumstances, governments do not always
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University. The au-
thor is grateful for consultation to Professor Virginia Leary.
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honor the right to form trade unions. When a foreign power captures a
territory in wartime and occupies it, the right becomes even more preca-
rious. Occupying powers are typically suspicious of trade unions, fearing
that they may foment opposition. Trade unions in many countries are
involved in political activity as part of their representation of workers.
What a trade union may characterize as protection of worker interests,
the occupant may characterize as an expression of hostility. Since polit-
ical activity in belligerent occupation is limited, the occupying power
may try to curtail what a trade union considers legitimate political
activity.
In recent years, the right to organize in belligerent occupation has
been an issue in connection with Israel's occupation of neighboring Arab
territory since 1967. Arab trade unions have charged violations of their
rights to organize, while the government of Israel has viewed many trade
unions as fronts for political opposition. This Article raises the questions
of whether a right to organize is guaranteed under belligerent occupa-
tion, where such a right might be found in the law, and what its content
might be.
Israel has restricted trade unions in a number of ways and has as-
serted legal justifications for those restrictions. An analysis of these re-
strictions and asserted justifications provides an opportunity to explore
the content of the right to organize under belligerent occupation.
The relations between an occupying power and the resident popula-
tion are governed by two bodies of law: humanitarian law and human
rights law. Humanitarian law specifically addresses occupation, which it
calls "belligerent occupation," meaning that the occupation is the result
of a belligerency or warfare. Human rights law is applicable more gener-
ally to relations between a population and the government that controls
it.
In both bodies of law, one finds a number of multilateral treaties to
which many states subscribe. In addition, one finds that many of the
norms in both humanitarian and human rights law have become custom-
ary international law, a body of law that is deemed binding on states even
apart from their adherence to a treaty. Customary law addressing the
right to organize under belligerent occupation may be important because
the states in question may not be parties to multilateral treaties that
would otherwise be controlling.
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II. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE UNDER
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND CUSTOMARY LAW
Humanitarian law was the first body of law to regulate belligerent
occupation.' Of ancient origin, humanitarian law assumed its modem
form in the nineteenth century. The formation of the Red Cross during
the Crimean War focused attention on both combatants and noncomba-
tants caught up in a war.2 In 1907 a comprehensive treaty to regulate
these matters, including the activity of a belligerent power that occupies
foreign territory, was concluded.3
The 1907 Convention is considered part of customary international
law.' Many norms in human rights law have become so generally recog-
nized that they are considered binding on all states as norms of custom-
ary international law.5 If the right to organize trade unions is part of
that body of customary law, then it must be observed by all states. It
represents a kind of common law at the international level.6
Humanitarian law developed further after World War II in a series
of four treaties adopted at Geneva in 1949. The fourth treaty, the Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
[hereinafter the 1949 Convention] provided a detailed set of regulations
that permit an occupying power to maintain order and its own control
while guaranteeing certain rights to the occupied population.7
Neither the 1907 nor the 1949 Convention mentions trade unions.
Thus, humanitarian law does not specifically address trade union organi-
zations. However, a right to organize is generally considered to be in-
cluded in more general postulates of the law of belligerent occupation. A
basic precept of that law is that a belligerent occupant shall preserve the
social and legal status quo of the occupied territory pending restoration
1. Abi-Saab, The Specificities of Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET
265, 266 (C. Swinarski ed. 1984).
2. COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDI-
TION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 9-11 (J. Pictet ed.
1952).
3. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631. [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
4. The 1907 Convention is so generally recognized by states that it is binding on them
even if they have not ratified it. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 38 (1989).
5. . STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 551 (1959).
6. See generally A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971).
7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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of sovereignty.8 An occupying power must apply the prior existing law
of the territory and permit the population to live with only such interfer-
ence as is necessary to maintain the occupation.9 This notion is found in
the 1907 Hague Regulations in a provision that calls upon an occupant to
maintain the "public life" of the territory.'" Therefore, under humanita-
rian law, if trade unions enjoyed a right to organize before the occupa-
tion, the occupant must respect that right. Conversely, if no such right
existed prior to the commencement of the occupation, the occupant
would not be required to recognize it.
During the twentieth century, states exercising belligerent occupa-
tion have typically permitted trade unions to function. The World War I
Allied Powers occupying the German Rhineland from 1918 to 1923 per-
mitted trade unions to operate, although they imposed limitations on the
unions' activities. I' The World War II Allied Powers occupying Ger-
many also permitted trade unions to operate, but with fewer limitations
than in the earlier Rhineland occupation.' 2 In Italy, the Allied adminis-
tration reinstated the Italian General Confederation of Labor which had
functioned prior to the fascist government. 13 Israel, in its occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967, has permitted trade unions to
exist while imposing limitations on their activity.'4
With respect to the right to organize, one finds both a virtually uni-
form practice of states in permitting trade unions to exist and a virtually
uniform recognition by states, in international instruments, that they are
obliged to permit trade unions to exist.' 5
Thus, both elements required for formation of a customary norm are
present-state practice and a recognition by states of the binding charac-
8. G. VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 94 (1957).
9. Id.
10. Hague Regulations, supra note 3, Annex, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2277, 1 Bevans at 651.
11. E. FRAENKEL, MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE RULE OF LAW: OCCUPATION
GOVERNMENT IN THE RHINELAND, 1918-1923, at 41-42 (1944).
12. E. LITCHFIELD, 2 GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY 364-65 (1953); see, e.g., Direc-
tive of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany (JCS 1067), in DOCU-
MENTS ON GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION 1945-1954, at 13, para. 23, at 23 (B. Ruhm von
Oppen ed. 1955).
13. M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 274 (1959) (citing Procla-
mation 7, July 7, 1943).
14. R. SHEHADEH & J. KUTFAB, THE WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW 119-20
(1980); see also ISRAEL NAT'L SEC., INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF
LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 79 (1981).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 22-29.
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ter of the norm.16
III. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE UNDER HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
The right to organize under belligerent occupation arguably derives
not only from humanitarian law, as embodied in the 1907 and 1949 Con-
ventions, but also from the international law of human rights. In the
mid-twentieth century, a body of law developed that limited states in
their treatment of the individual and of social groups. This law of human
rights, which claimed universal applicability,17 developed through a se-
ries of human rights treaties and by the operation of a number of interna-
tional organizations.' I
Professor C. Wilfred Jenks finds a customary law obligation provid-
ing the right to organize in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 19 The Declaration provides: "Everyone has the right to form and
to join trade unions for the protection of his interests." 0 Many commen-
tators argue that all norms in the Universal Declaration have entered
customary law as result of state practice: "This constant and widespread
recognition of the principles of the Universal Declaration clothes it, in
my opinion, in the character of customary law."21
Both major human rights treaties recognize a right to form trade
unions. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pro-
vides: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protec-
tion of his interests."2 2 The International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights provides a "right of everyone to form trade
16. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
paras. 37, 71.
17. Quigley, Territorial Applicability of the Convention: Article 4, in INDEPENDENT COM-
MENTARY: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 29-31 (1988).
18. T. MERON, supra note 4, at 79-80.
19. C.W. JENKS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 50
(1960).
20. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 23,
para. 4, at 71 (1948).
21. Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of
the European Convention, in BRIT. INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, INT'L LAW SER. No. 5,
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (1965); see also Humphrey, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in *HUMAN RIGHTS:
THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 33 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1979);
Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 813, 816 (1978).
22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, art. 22, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178.
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unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of
the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his eco-
nomic and social interests.",23
Regional human rights treaties uniformly provide for a right to or-
ganize trade unions. The Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Europe) provides: "Everyone has
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests."' 24 The European Social Charter provides:
With a view to ensuring or promoting the freedom of workers and
employers to form local, national or international organisations for the
protection of their economic and social interests and to join those orga-
nizations, the Contracting Parties undertake that national law shall not
be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, this
freedom.25
The American Convention on Human Rights provides: "Everyone has
the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic,
labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes."26 The African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights states: "Every individual shall have the
right to free association provided that he abides by the law."27 The Eu-
ropean Human Rights Commission has enforced the European treaty's
provision on association, finding that the state may not interfere with
trade union activity. The Commission has ruled that the provision "re-
quires that trade unions should be able to pursue their tasks including, in
particular, the protection of the interests of their members without inter-
ference by State authorities. ' 28 Thus, the major universal and regional
human rights treaties protect trade union organizing.
In addition, a treaty specifically addressing the right to trade union
organizing has been ratified by over ninety states. The Freedom of Asso-
ciation and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention provides:
"Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the
right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization con-
23. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, art. 8, para. la, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6.
24. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 11, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232 [hereinafter European Convention].
25. European Social Charter, 1961 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 38, art. 5 (Cmd. 2643).
26. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 16, 9 I.L.M. 673, 680
[hereinafter American Convention].
27. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Jan. 7-19, 1981, art. 10, para. 1, 21
I.L.M. 58, 61 [hereinafter African Charter].
28. X. v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 57, 62-63 (1981).
[Vol. 13
Trade Unions and War
cerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without previous
authorization."2 9
Thus, a right to organize is found in human rights law, both as a
customary norm and as a treaty norm in treaties with wide adherence.
IV. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
The first area of human rights to receive international protection
was labor rights. Following World War I, the international community
founded the International Labor Organization (ILO), partly out of a rec-
ognition that industrial harmony was a prerequisite for international
peace and partly because of the importance to workers of the right to
30organize.
Since that time, the ILO has developed a prodigious body of labor
standards. Perhaps the most important of these is the right of labor to
organize trade unions."a This right is necessary in an industrial context if
workers are to participate meaningfully in setting labor conditions.32 It
is also necessary to prevent exploitation by employers, particularly in a
period of scarcity of work, when market forces permit an employer to
offer minimal compensation for work performed.33
Approximately 150 states that belong to the ILO recognize a right
of association.34 The ILO bases its structure on the premise that govern-
ments, management, and organized labor each have a role in industrial
relations; therefore, the ILO Governing Body is composed of representa-
tives of workers, employers, and governments. 35 The Annex to the ILO
Constitution proclaims as an aim of the ILO that "freedom of expression
and of association are essential to sustained progress. ' 36 Thus, a failure
to recognize the right of labor to organize is inconsistent with member-
ship in the ILO. Under ILO procedures, complaints alleging violation of
the right of freedom of association may be brought against even those
29. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Or-
ganize, adopted July 9, 1948, art. 2, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, 20 [hereinafter Freedom of Association
Convention].
30. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, preamble, 62 Stat.
3485, 3490, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 40.
31. N. VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAw 79-81 (1979).
32. See id. at 79.
33. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 284-85 (1961).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
35. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, supra note 30, art. 7, para. 1, 62
Stat. at 3500, 15 U.N.T.S. at 50-52.
36. Id. annex, para. I(b), 62 Stat. at 3554, 15 U.N.T.S. at 104.
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member states that have not ratified the Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention.37
The International Labor Organization has developed a substantial
body of practice in the implementation of the right of trade union or-
ganizing. The Freedom of Association Committee of the ILO's Gov-
erning Body adjudicates complaints alleging violation of the freedom of
association.38
The ILO also accepts that the right to organize has entered custom-
ary law as a result of widespread recognition of it: "The principle of free-
dom of association is particularly important in the ILO, where it is
looked upon as a kind of customary rule which has become part of the
common heritage of man in the twentieth century, independently of the
provisions of international labor Conventions."39 The ILO's Fact-Find-
ing and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association has stated
that "freedom of association has become a customary rule above the
[ILO] Conventions."''4
Treaty obligations can be determined by reading the treaty's provi-
sions. However when a customary norm is involved, the matter requires
more exploration. The practice of states defines the precise scope of a
customary norm. Attempting to determine the scope of the customary
right to organize confronts one with the difficulty that most state practice
takes place through the ILO, which typically applies treaties. Thus, trea-
ties are usually applied when violations of the right to organize are al-
leged, and only rarely does the matter have to be considered under
customary law apart from a treaty obligation.
This difficulty is not insurmountable. The International Court of
Justice faced a similar problem in Nicaragua v. United States.41 In that
case, Nicaragua alleged aggression by the United States. The Court
37. N. VALTICOS, supra note 31, at 248; see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, THE
TRADE UNION SITUATION IN CHILE: REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING AND CONCILIATION
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION para. 466 (1975). The Freedom of Association
Committee stated that even though Chile had not ratified the Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), "by its membership of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation, Chile is bound to respect a certain number of general rules which
have been established for the common good of the peoples of the twentieth century." The
Committee found freedom of association to be included among those general rules. Id.
38. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORG., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITrEE OF THE GOVERNING
BODY OF THE ILO paras. 208-83, at 44-59 (3d ed. 1985).
39. G. CAIRE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 29 (1977).
40. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, supra note 37, para. 466.
41. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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found that because of limitations in the United States acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction, it had to decide Nicaragua's allegations not on the
basis of the United Nations Charter but on the basis of customary law.4'
Confronted with the fact that most state practice had turned on the
Charter, it concluded, with little discussion, that customary law did not
differ from the Charter law as to the use of force.4 3
The same conclusion may also be reached regarding the content of
the customary right to freedom of association. ILO practice implement-
ing treaties on freedom of association serves as a guide to the content of
the customary norm. To provide a comprehensive enumeration of pro-
tected rights exceeds the scope of this analysis, but one can conclude
that, at a minimum, the customary norm includes: a right to form trade
unions;' a prohibition against governmental exclusion of a worker from
a trade union because of the worker's political opinion;45 a prohibition
against governmental interference in election of trade union officers (such
as a procedure whereby candidates must be approved by the govern-
ment);46 a prohibition against dismissal of trade union officials by the
government, in any situation, but including removal because of a trade
union official's political activity;47 and a prohibition against government
closure of a trade union.48 The ILO Freedom of Association Committee
has found all of these concepts to be within the right to freedom of asso-
ciation. The customary norm also prohibits detention as punishment for
trade union activity.49
Thus, the ILO, working with both treaties and customary law, has
provided the focal point for the development of the right to organize
under human rights law. Its proceedings and decisions are the most fer-
tile source for determining the scope and content of this right.
42. Id. paras. 187-201.
43. Id.
44. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORG., supra note 38, para. 208, at 44.
45. Id. para. 212, at 45.
46. Id. paras. 455-61, at 87-88.
47. Id. paras. 476-79, at 90.
48. Id. paras. 487-88, at 92.
49. See, for example, two decisions of the Human Rights Committee that implement the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: (1) The Case of Ismael Weinberger in
which the Committee found a violation of Covenant article 19, paragraph 2, (freedom of dx-
pression) "because [Weinberger] was detained for having disseminated information relating to
trade-union activities", Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
40) at 119, U.N. Doe. A/36/40 (1981) and (2) The Case of Rosario Pietraroia (an official of the
Uruguay metal workers union) in which the Committee found a violation of Covenant article
19, paragraph 2 "because [Pietraroia] was arrested, detained and tried for his political and
trade-union activities." Id. at 159.
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V. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE IN THE CONTEXT OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
While it appears that customary law includes a right to organize, the
question remains whether that guarantee applies during belligerent occu-
pation. Human rights law is a law of universal applicability. Yet, bellig-
erent occupation is an abnormal situation. The population is not loyal to
the occupying power. It typically is anxious for the occupying power to
leave and may take forcible action against the occupying power.
Although relations between the population and the government are ab-
normal in belligerent occupation, states consider that the right to organ-
ize nonetheless applies.
A. Applicability of Human Rights Law
1. United Nations Practice
United Nations reports, resolutions, and decisions on belligerent oc-
cupation reflect state practice for the position that customary human
rights law applies in belligerent occupation.5" The United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly affirmed, in a nearly unanimous resolution, the applicabil-
ity of human rights law to armed conflict: "Fundamental human rights,
as accepted in international law and laid down in international instru-
ments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict." 51
The Assembly has referred to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as providing law applicable in belligerent occupation. In estab-
lishing a committee to monitor human rights in territories occupied by
Israel in 1967, the Assembly stated that it was "[g]uided by... the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights."52 In a resolution calling on Israel
to accept recommendations made by that monitoring committee, the As-
sembly asked Israel "to comply with its obligations under.., the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights."
53
50. For a more detailed discussion, see Quigley, The Relation between Human Rights Law
and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Does an Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom
of Assembly and Expression?, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1989).
51. Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, G.A.
Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) para. 1, at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). The vote
was 109 to zero, with eight abstentions. 25 U.N. GAOR para. 127, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/
PV.1922 (1970).
52. Respect for and Implementation of Human Rights in Occupied Territories, G.A. Res.
2443, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) preambular para. 1, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969)
(emphasis omitted).
53. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, G.A. Res 2727, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) para. 2, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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After conducting a study mandated by the General Assembly, the
Secretary-General also found human rights law to apply in wartime:
"[T]he human rights provisions of the [United Nations] Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants
on Human Rights apply both in times of peace and in times of war and
armed conflicts."54 He found that "[t]he phraseology of the [United Na-
tions] Charter would.., encompass persons living under the jurisdiction
of their own national authorities and persons living in territories under
belligerent occupation.""5 The Secretary-General considered Security
Council Resolution 237, adopted following the 1967 Arab-Israeli con-
flict, reflective of state practice. The Resolution contemplated the appli-
cability of human rights norms in wartime:
The principle that human rights shall be protected not only in peace
time but also under conditions of armed conflict was significantly re-
peated more recently by the Security Council when, in its resolution
237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, it stated that "essential and inalienable
human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of
war."
56
The Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, like the
General Assembly, has relied upon the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in calling upon Israel to refrain from certain actions in territory it
occupied in 1967.17 The Commission stated that
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
and those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Member
States bear a special responsibility to ensure the protection of human
rights and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the
dignity and worth of the human person.58
The reference to the Charter is evidently to its provisions on human
rights-articles 1, 55, and 56." The Commission has also referred to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a document by
which it is "guided" in assessing the situation in the Arab territory occu-
pied by Israel in 1967. o
54. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict Report of the Secretary-General, 25 U.N.
GAOR at 87, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970).
55. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict Report of the Secretary-General, 24 U.N.
GAOR at 12, U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969).
56. Id. at 15.
57. 52 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Supp. (No. 7) at 51, U.N. Doc. E/5113 & E/
CN.4/1097 (1972).
58. Id.
59. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1, 55, 56.
60. Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including
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That United Nations bodies should consider human rights law ap-
plicable in occupied territory is consistent with the history of the devel-
opment of human rights law by the United Nations. The United Nations
promoted human rights law, in part, because of the atrocities committed
in occupied territory during World War II:
The prominence given to human rights in the Charter was the conse-
quence of the appalling atrocities and degradations inflicted by the
Nazi regime on the Jews of Europe and on peoples of the occupied
territories. The motive behind its provisions was the desire to prevent
any recurrence of such outrages upon humanity by making the preser-
vation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual every-
where a matter of international concern to every State. 61
2. European Human Rights Practice
Perhaps the most detailed definitions of human rights have been de-
veloped by the institutions that implement the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.62
Adopted in 1950, this Convention enjoys the best enforcement mecha-
nism of any human rights treaty. A Commission of Human Rights
screens complaints and publishes its findings. 63 A Court of Human
Rights stands above the Commission to hear cases of particular complex-
ity. 64 Its case reports provide detailed consideration of many points of
human rights law.
While the Court of Human Rights has not considered the applicabil-
ity of customary human rights under belligerent occupation, the Com-
mission of Human Rights has twice addressed this issue.6"
After Turkey occupied a portion of Cyprus in 1974, Cyprus alleged
extensive violations of human rights. Since both Cyprus and Turkey are
parties to the European Convention, Cyprus filed a complaint against
Turkey with the Commission on Human Rights.66 Turkey responded by
denying that it was in belligerent occupation, arguing that a new govern-
ment, not under Turkey's control, had been established in the portion of
Cyprus in question.67
Palestine, Res. 1987/2, [10 Bulletin No. 3] U.N. Div. PALESTINIAN RTS. para. 2, at 6 (Mar.
1987).
61. Waldock, supra note 21, at 1 (emphasis added).
62. European Convention, supra note 24, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234.
63. See id. arts. 20-37, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234-42.
64. See id. arts. 38-56, 213 U.N.T.S. at 242-48.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 66-76.
66. Cyprus v. Turkey, 62 I.L.R. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 5, 9 (1982).
67. Id. at 27-28.
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In finding the Cyprus application admissible, the Commission de-
cided that Turkey did exercise control as a belligerent occupant. 68 Turk-
ish forces, it said, had "entered the island of Cyprus, operating solely
under the direction of the Turkish Government and under established
rules governing the structure and command of these armed forces includ-
ing the establishment of military courts."'69 The Commission cited arti-
cle 1 of the European Convention, which renders state parties responsible
for human rights "to everyone within their jurisdiction. '70 It stated that
this article means "that the High Contracting Parties are bound to secure
the said rights and freedoms to all persons under their actual authority
and responsibility, not only when that authority is exercised within their
own territory but also when it is exercised abroad. '71
The Commission's decision in Cyprus v. Turkey has been character-
ized as "a significant recognition in principle of the applicability of inter-
national human rights law to occupied territories."'72 The Commission's
rationale is that a state party is responsible in any territory over which it
exercises jurisdiction. Thus, a state coming into control of a territory is
responsible as soon as that control is established, even before it estab-
lishes any governmental institutions.73
The Commission reached the same conclusion in an earlier case.
Rudolf Hess, the Nazi official, was incarcerated in Spandau Prison, Ber-
lin, for World War II crimes against peace. His wife petitioned for his
release. The United Kingdom was one of four states in joint belligerent
occupation of Berlin. The Commission had to determine whether the
United Kingdom was responsible for any violation of Hess's rights. It
addressed the quadripartite character of the occupation:
The commission is of the opinion that the joint authority cannot be
divided into four separate jurisdictions and that therefore the United
Kingdom's participation in the exercise of the joint authority and con-
sequently in the administration and supervision of Spandau Prison is
not a matter "within the jurisdiction" of the United Kingdom, within
68. Id. at 74-75.
69. Id. at 75:
70. Id. at 74.
71. Id.
72. Roberts, What Is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 287 (1985). For
agreement with the statement in the text that the Commission ruled that the Convention was
applicable to a state party exercising belligerent occupation, see Buergenthal, To Respect and
to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTs 72, 76-77 (L. Henkin ed. 1981).
73. Buergenthal, supra note 72, at 76-77.
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the meaning of Art. 1 of the Convention.74
The Commission said "that there is in principle, from a legal point
of view, no reason why acts of the British authorities in Berlin should not
entail the liability of the United Kingdom under the Convention., 75
Although it found that the quadripartite character of the occupation re-
lieved the United Kingdom of responsibility, the Commission considered
the European Convention to cover the United Kingdom's actions while
in belligerent occupation of foreign territory.7 6
In considering the population under Israel's belligerent occupation,
Professor Theodor Meron concluded that the population has the right to
invoke customary human rights norms before Israel's courts.77 Both the
United Nations practice and the European practice confirm the applica-
tion of human rights law to belligerent occupation. Wherever a state
exerts control, it is responsible for its treatment of the population, re-
gardless of the legal basis on which the state controls the territory.
B. Applicability of Labor Rights Treaties in Force in the Occupied
Territory at Commencement of the Occupation
One body of law applicable to the right to organize in territory held
in belligerent occupation is treaties in force for the displaced sovereign.
As one of its obligations under humanitarian law, a military occu-
pant must retain in force the law in effect in territory it occupies. 78 The
1907 Hague Regulations impose on an occupant an obligation to "re-
store,. . unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. 7 9
This norm has become customary law.80
This principle applies to any treaty considered by the displaced sov-
ereign to have been part of the law in force. The treaty is law regardless
if the sovereign legislated the treaty into domestic law, or by other legis-
lation, or, in practice, considered it to be part of the law in force without
legislative incorporation.
74. Hess v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 72, 74 (1975) (decision on ad-
missibility).
75. Id. at 73.
76. See id.
77. Meron, West Bank and Gaza: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the Period of
Transition, 9 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 106, 113 (1979).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
79. Hague Regulations, supra note 3, Annex, art. 43, 35 Stat. at 2306, 1 Bevans at 651.
80. Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government-the Initial
Stages, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-
1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 13, 28-29 (M. Shamgar ed. 1982) [hereinafter MILITARY
GOVERNMENT].
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Not all treaties adhered to by the displaced sovereign need be en-
forced by the military occupant. A treaty of military alliance, for exam-
ple, would not be part of the law in force since it would not create rights
and duties for persons inhabiting the territory that came under occupa-
tion. However, a labor convention creates rights and duties for persons
and, therefore, is part of the law in force.
Professor Meron applies these postulates to labor rights treaties of
the displaced sovereign. "If, prior to the commencement of the occupa-
tion of a territory, the territorial sovereign had ratified an international
labor convention and adopted the necessary implementing legislation, the
occupant must respect the relevant labor standards as part of the local
legislation in force."81 This view is correct although, as noted, the treaty
may have entered into domestic law other than by enactment of imple-
menting legislation for the specific treaty.
The ILO Governing Body concurs with Professor Meron's view
with respect to the Freedom of Association Convention. It has found
that the Convention is applicable in territory under belligerent occupa-
tion if the sovereign displaced by the occupation was a party to it at the
commencement of the occupation.82
Labor conventions adhered to by the displaced sovereign before the
occupation and in force at the commencement of the occupation consti-
tute part of the law in force in the occupied territory. These labor con-
ventions, therefore, are part of the law that a military occupant is obliged
to enforce.
C. Applicability of Labor Rights Treaties to Which the Occupying
Power Is a Party
A belligerent occupant may itself be a party to labor rights treaties.
If so, the question arises whether it must provide rights contained in
these treaties to the population of a territory it occupies, even though
81. Meron, Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territories, in MILITARY
GOVERNMENT, supra note 80, at 228.
82. The Governing Body found this by negative implication. In deciding whether the
Convention is binding on Israel with respect to the West Bank, it said: "It may be noted that
Convention No. 87, which has not been ratified by Jordan, was not applicable to the West
Bank at the time of the occupation." Report of the Director-General. Sixth Supplementary
Report: Second Report of the Officers of the Governing Body: Representation submitted by the
Union of Building and Construction Workers of Nablus and thirteen other trade unions under
article 24 of the Constitution of the ILO alleging non-observance by Israel of the Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR OFFICE GOVERNING BODY (233d sess.) para. 6, at 2, ILO Doc. GB.233/16/30
(May-June 1986) [hereinafter Report of Director General].
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these treaty obligations would not have been part of the law in force in
the occupied territory at the commencement of the occupation.
The human rights treaties themselves address the issue of the terri-
torial reach of their obligations. The Convention on the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Europe) obliges state par-
ties to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction" the rights enumer-
ated in the Convention.83 The European Commission of Human Rights
applied this provision and found the Convention applicable to belligerent
occupation in Hess v. United Kingdom84 and Cyprus v. Turkey." The
American Convention on Human Rights uses similar phrasing, obliging
state parties to protect "all persons subject to their jurisdiction."86 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires a state
party to protect "all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction ... ."87 Thus, each treaty requires a state party to assure the
protection of human rights beyond territory over which it holds sover-
eignty, to territory in its "jurisdiction."
The Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organize contains no language specifying the territory in
which the Convention is to apply. One provision of the Convention indi-
cates that it is to apply in "colonies, protectorates and possessions which
are not fully self-governing."88 Therefore, the Convention applies
outside the metropolitan territory of a state party.
Moreover, human rights treaties are construed expansively to pro-
vide maximum protection of rights.8 9 For example, in 1951 the Interna-
tional Court of Justice decided to permit reservations to the Genocide
Convention to achieve maximum applicability.9" At a time when reser-
vations were not generally admitted in multilateral treaties, the Court
found that they should be permitted in the case of the Genocide Conven-
tion because of its humanitarian purpose.9
Neither the universal and regional human rights treaties nor the
83. European Convention, supra note 24, at 224.
84. 2 Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rts. 72 (1975) (decision on admissibility); see supra text accom-
panying notes 74-76.
85. 62 I.L.R. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 5 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes
66-71.
86. American Convention, supra note 26, art. 1, at 675.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 22, art. 2, para. 1, at
173.
88. Freedom of Association Convention, supra note 29, art. 12, at 22.
89. See infra text accompanying note 90.
90. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. Advisory Opinions 15 (May 28) [hereinafter Genocide Case].
91. Id. at 22-24.
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Convention Concerning Freedom of Association mention the effect of
belligerent occupation.92 However, they should be construed to apply
wherever a state party exercises jurisdiction, whether de jure or de facto.
One possible objection to applying such treaties in belligerent occu-
pation is the possible affront to the sovereignty of the displaced power.
This consideration has been raised in ILO proceedings.93 However, ap-
plication of a human rights treaty does not imply that the belligerent
occupant is sovereign. Furthermore, the humanitarian purpose of
human rights law makes it particularly important that such treaties be
applied. As indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Geno-
cide case:
In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests
of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest,
namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the
raison d'etre of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this
type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to
States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between
rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention pro-
vide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and
measure of all its provisions.94
The ILO has consistently decided with this view. It determined that
in accord with the fact that all state members of the ILO are obliged to
allow freedom of trade union association,9" a state member is bound by
this obligation in territory it holds under belligerent occupation.96
Reports have been ified with the ILO by Israel regarding its compli-
ance with ILO conventions in the West Bank, over which it exercises
belligerent occupation.97 The Israeli government acknowledged before
the ILO that it is bound by the Convention Concerning Freedom of As-
sociation, to which it is a party, in governing the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.98 However, the ILO has said that member states are not bound to
submit to the jurisdiction of the ILO Governing Body, which also inves-
tigates freedom of association violations regarding territory held in bel-
ligerent occupation.99 The ILO reached this decision by construing the
92. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
93. Meron, supra note 81, at 223.
94. Genocide Case, supra note 90, at 23.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
96. Report of Director-General, supra note 82, para. 10.
97. See Meron, supra note 81, at 222.
98. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORG., FREEDOM OF AS'N COMM., REPORT 24 (1988).
Israel ratified the Freedom of Association Convention on January 28, 1957.
99. Report of Director-General, supra note 82, para. 7.
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Director-General's Standing Orders, which authorize the Governing
Body to hear complaints regarding matters arising "within [a Member
State's] jurisdiction.""loo
This decision is inconsistent with the European Commission's find-
ing that reference to actions "within [a state's] jurisdiction" applies to
actions in territory held in belligerent occupation by a state. 101 The
Commission's interpretation is more consistent with the humanitarian
character of human rights law. A state has jurisdiction in territory it
holds under belligerent occupation, although it does not have sover-
eignty. That jurisdiction is recognized for a wide variety of purposes,
including the adoption of legislation and the enforcement of penal sanc-
tions. This jurisdiction should extend to labor law regulation.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
UNDER BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
A belligerent occupant may take the position that it has the right to
limit trade union organization because of the inherent nature of occupa-
tion.' 0 2 However, the ability of a state to restrict labor rights depends on
a case-by-case assessment of particular situations. Under human rights
law, a military occupant may restrict the right to organize only if the
exercise of the right threatens national security, public order, or during a
declared public emergency.
10 3
A. Threat to National Security or Public Order
The human rights instruments quoted above typically permit a state
to limit the rights to protect national security and public order. The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights permits states to restrict by law any
of the rights enumerated in the Declaration because of the "just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.""°
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights permits limited restrictions on the right to form and join trade
unions that "are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of na-
tional security or public order or for the protection of the rights and
100. Standing Orders, art. 2, para. 2(f), reprinted in Report of the Director-General, supra
note 82, para. 4, at 2.
101. See supra notes 66-76.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 104-12.
104. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 20, art. 29, para. 2.
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freedoms of others." ' 5 Similarly, the right of trade unions to "function
freely" may be "subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."10 6 Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which provides a right to form and join trade un-
ions, states:
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, pub-
lic order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 107
The European Convention 0 8 and European Social Charter 0 9 have
similar limitations on the right to organize and to form and join trade
unions. The American Convention on Human Rights protects trade
union organizing, "subject only to such restrictions established by law as
may be necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national se-
curity, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others." 10 In addition, the American Con-
vention limits all the rights it enumerates as follows: "The rights of each
person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by
the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society."'11
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights provides that,
with respect to all enumerated rights, "It]he rights and freedoms of each
individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, col-
lective security, morality and common interest." 1 2
In ILO practice, these limiting circumstances are rarely used.11 3
They may not be invoked to prohibit normal trade union activity. In
particular, the political opinion or activities of a trade union, its officials,
or members may not serve as a reason for limiting trade union rights. 1 1 4
105. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 23, art.
8, para. la, at 6.
106. Id.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 22, art. 22, para. 2, at
178.
108. European Convention, supra note 24, at 232.
109. European Social Charter, supra note 25, art. 31, para. 1.
110. American Convention, supra note 26, art. 16, para. 2, at 680.
111. Id. art. 32, para. 2, at 684.
112. African Charter, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 2, at 63.
113. N. VALTICOS, supra note 31, at 233.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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B. Public Emergency
Human rights instruments also typically permit derogation during
wartime or other public emergency to the extent necessitated by the
emergency. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
permits a state party to declare a "public emergency" in a situation that
"threatens the life of the nation."'' 15 It also lists certain provisions from
which no derogation is permitted even during an emergency. 1 6 Protec-
tion of the right of trade union association is included on the list." 7
The European Convention provides that "in time of war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation," derogation is per-
mitted "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion.""' The European Social Charter, similarly, provides:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this Charter to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not incon-
sistent with its other obligations under international law.119
Likewise, the American Convention allows derogation "in time of
war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence
or security of a State Party ... to the extent and for the period of time
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."' 20
A public emergency must be found to exist on objective criteria. A
state declaring an emergency is entitled to a "margin of appreciation" in
assessing a threat,' 2 ' but it bears the burden of proving conditions that
justify the declaration. 122
In 1957, the Republic of Ireland's government declared a "public
emergency" and, on the basis of the declaration, derogated from certain
rights guaranteed under the European Convention.123 When the declara-
115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 22, art. 4, para. 1, at
174.
116. Id. para. 2.
117. Id.
118. European Convention, supra note 24, art. 15, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
119. European Social Charter, supra note 25, art. 30, para. 1.
120. American Convention, supra note 26, art. 27, para.1, at 683.
121. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. (Eur. Comm'n of Hum. Rts. 72,
73-74) 72; Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of Decem-
ber 1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEV-
ENTH NOBEL SYMPOSIUM, OSLO, SEPTEMBER 25-26, 1967, at 116 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds.
1968); Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 297-
301 (1978).
122. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. (Eur. Comm'n of Hum. Rts.) 72.
123. "Lawless" Case, 1961 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
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tion was challenged under the Convention, the European Court of
Human Rights found that "a secret army engaged in unconstitutional
activities and using violence to attain its purposes" was operating in Ire-
land. 124 It found a "steady and alarming increase in terrorist activities
from the autumn of 1956 and throughout the first half of 1957. "125 The
Court defined a "public emergency" as "an exceptional situation of crisis
or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat
to the organized life of the community of which the State is com-
posed." 126 Accordingly, it found the declaration of the Republic of Ire-
land justified.'27
In contrast, the European Commission of Human Rights found no
public emergency existing in Greece in 1967 after the governing military
junta had declared a state of siege. 128 The junta asserted that a govern-
ment takeover by insurgents was imminent. 29 It cited street demonstra-
tions and labor strikes, but the Commission did not find their scope
extraordinary. 130 The Commission found no public emergency although
it conceded that Greece had experienced "political instability and ten-
sion, . . . an expansion of the activities of the Communists and their al-
lies, and.., some public disorder." 131 The Commission stated that for a
"public emergency" there must be an imminent threat to the existing
order, not merely the possibility that the current situation might lead to
such a threat.1 3
2
The ILO has posited that war does not free a state of its obligations
to comply with international labor standards; however, belligerents may
agree between themselves to suspend such obligations during a war.133
As indicated above, belligerent occupation does not constitute a public
emergency. States have recognized an obligation to permit trade union
organizing under belligerent occupation.134 The ILO has found wartime
restrictions applicable only during actual hostilities.1' 5
Thus, under human rights law, a government must demonstrate a
124. Id. at 56.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 62.
128. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. (Eur. Comm'n. on Hum. Rts.) 72,
73-74.
129. Id. at 25, 33.
130. Id. at 75.
131. Id. at 73-75.
132. Id. at 73.
133. N. VALTICOS, supra note 31, at 233.
134. See supra text accompanying note 31.
135. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORG., supra note 38, para. 422, at 82.
1990]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
threat to the survival of the current order before it may derogate from
the right to organize by declaring a public emergency. Short of a public
emergency, a government may derogate from the right only if the right is
being exercised in such a way as to threaten national security or public
order in a significant manner.
Unlike human rights law, humanitarian law does not include a for-
mal concept of derogation. Instead, an occupant is permitted to take
measures to protect its security but may not unduly restrict rights.
VII. ISRAELI RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE UNIONS IN
THE GAZA STRIP AND WEST BANK
In its post-1967 occupation of the Gaza Strip, Israel prohibited
trade unions from functioning until 1979 and thereafter interfered with
efforts by unions to elect new officers. 13 6 Such a sweeping measure can-
not be reconciled with the workers' right to organize, although lesser
measures may be permissible. The Israeli government justified measures
against a trade union coalition in the Gaza Strip because the union had
adopted a resolution declaring that the Palestine Liberation Organization
was the sole political representative of the Palestinian people. 137
Trade unions often participate in the political process in their coun-
tries by supporting candidates for political office and making representa-
tions to the government on a broad range of social and economic issues.
Since the early twentieth century, many political parties have their base
of support in organized labor. Since, in belligerent occupation, the popu-
lation is likely to be hostile to the government, any kind of association
may become a source of opposition. The government may consider even
narrowly defined trade union activity to have a political character. A
trade union's political positions may cause special concern to an occupy-
ing power. Professor Greenspan states that since trade unions "could use
their economic functions to constitute themselves as centers of resistance
to the occupant," an occupant may "eliminate their political features,
confining them solely to their economic functions."' 13 1
Notwithstanding Professor Greenspan's statement, it would seem
that an occupant must justify anti-union measures on more than supposi-
136. Hiltermann, Palestinian Unions: Force for Change in the West Bank, NATION, Oct. 3,
1987, at 338, 340.
137. Complaint Against the Government of Israel Presented by the Gaza Building Work-
ers' and Carpenters' Union and the Gaza Commercial and Public Service Workers' Union, No.
1414, [71 Official Bulletin] International Labor Org., 256th Report of the Comm. on Freedom
of Ass'n, Ser. B, No. 2, paras. 90, 115, at 21, 26 (May-June 1988) [hereinafter Complaint].
138. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 13, at 274.
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tion as to their effects. In light of the postulates of human rights law,
which protect political freedoms more broadly than does humanitarian
law,139 an occupant may limit trade union political activity only when it
presents a substantial threat. It may not ban political activity altogether.
In addition, criteria limiting union activity which on its face does
not discriminate, may do so in practice. The Israeli government has pro-
hibited a number of elected union officials in the Gaza Strip from taking
their seats because they had been convicted of a criminal offense. The
government cited the labor law in force at the commencement of the
occupation (enacted by Egypt in 1954) which said that persons convicted
of a felony were ineligible for union office."4 Invoking the same legisla-
tion, it revoked the registration of unions that elected persons who had
been convicted of felonies under the same Egyptian law. 141
A number of these persons, however, had been convicted under laws
established by Israel for the Gaza Strip for membership in an organiza-
tion hostile to Israel. Palestinians viewed this activity as legitimate polit-
ical activity.142 Other offenses involved acts of violence against the
occupying forces.1 4 3 A criminal conviction involving any security-re-
lated act was, in the view of many union members, not necessarily an
indication of bad character relevant in considering an individual for trade
union office."4 Beyond the political character of the acts, union mem-
bers were suspicious of convictions because trials were conducted in mili-
tary tribunals that international human rights organizations have
criticized for the quality of their justice. 145
In hearing a complaint from Gaza trade unions, the Freedom of
Association Committee of the ILO said that the Israeli government had
violated the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association by using
convictions for such crimes as membership in hostile organizations.1 46
The Committee said that such convictions did not reflect on a person's
139. Quigley, supra note 50, at 15-17.
140. Complaint, supra note 137, para. 109, at 25.
141. Id. para. 113, at 26.
142. Id. para. 97, at 22-23.
143. Id. para. 111, at 25-26.
144. Id. para. 97, at 22-23.
145. Report and Recommendations of an Amnesty International Mission to the Government
of the State of Israel, 3-7 June 1979, Including the Government's Response and Amnesty Inter-
national Comments 9-13, 43 (1980). In 1987 an Israeli government commission found that
government interrogators in such cases commonly used physical force to extract confessions
from suspects and that such confessions often formed the primary evidence of guilt at trial.
Quigley, International Limits on Use of Force to Elicit Confessions: A Critique of Israel's Policy
on Interrogation, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 485, 486-89 (1988).
146. Complaint, supra note 137, para. 123, at 28.
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fitness to carry out union duties.147 The ILO action in this case indicates
the importance of the ILO role in providing outside assessment of claims
and counterclaims by the parties.
One West Bank trade union that had been the subject of adverse
administrative action vindicated its rights in the Supreme Court of Israel.
When a group of lawyers sought to form a lawyers' union in the West
Bank, the Israeli military governor issued an order retaining for himself
the right to appoint the members of the executive committee of the union
and prohibiting independent financing of the union."' The Supreme
Court of Israel ruled that the lawyers had a right to elect their own exec-
utive committee and to fund the union themselves. 49 The Court based
its finding on article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which, as indi-
cated, requires an occupier to preserve the "public life" of the occupied
territory. 150 The Court said that the "public life" that an occupant is
required to restore is that of a democratic late twentieth-century state.
151
The Court thus found a requirement of following democratic practices
which included a right for at least this particular union to elect its own
officers. However, the military governor still had power to dismiss union
officers who might have a connection with a "hostile organization."' 5 2
The Court found freedom of trade union activity to be protected in dem-
ocratic society. 153 Therefore, the Court found certain basic trade union
rights protected under humanitarian law.
In 1988 when the West Bank and Gaza Strip took preparatory steps
to declare an independent Palestinian state, the government of Israel
closed a number of trade unions.' 54 It closed the Federation of Labor
Unions in the West Bank, located in Nablus,"' whose building housed
eight trade unions.1 6 It closed the Professional Unions Complex build-
ing in Beit Hanina (West Bank), which housed the professional associa-
tions of physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists, lawyers,
147. Id.
148. Touma, Working vs. Striking Lawyers and the Right to Form a Union, Al-Fajr, Oct.
18, 1987, at 8, col. I (reporting Bahij Tamimi v. Minister of Defense (Case of Arab Lawyers'
Union), No. 507/85 (Isr. High Ct. J. Sept. 16, 1987) (Goldberg, J., with Alon, Halima, JJ.,
concurring)).
149. Id.
150. Hague Regulations, supra note 3, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306, 1 Bevans at 651.
151. Touma, supra note 148 para. 2.
152. Id. para. 10.
153. Id. para. 1.
154. See NATIONAL LAWYERS' GUILD, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING 82 (1989).
155. Israel Targets Palestinian Institutions and Unions, A1-Fajr, Aug. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
156. Israel Closes Charitable Societies, Al-Fajr, Sept. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
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engineers, and agricultural engineers. The government order stated as
the reason for closure that meetings had been held at the building, at the
instance of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to establish alternative
administrative institutions for the West Bank.15 7 According to police,
the organizations were being prepared, at the suggestion of the PLO, as
new institutions of governance.1 -
8
The positions taken by the West Bank and Gaza trade unions and
by the government of Israel, as well as the ILO's rulings on these cases,
suggest that no blanket exception from the demands of the Convention
Concerning Freedom of Association derives from belligerent occupation.
Although the ILO committee ruled that Israel had violated the right to
organize in various ways when it limited trade unions, the Israeli govern-
ment has invoked bases specific to the situation. It has not claimed a
blanket right to infringe trade union rights simply on the basis of being in
belligerent occupation.
Thus, the experience from Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip and
West Bank is that all parties agree that a right to organize applies. Sig-
nificant differences of view emerged, however, because the Israeli govern-
ment construed as inappropriate much union activity deemed
appropriate by the trade unionists. This experience points up the diffi-
culty of assessing claims by the parties and the importance of a third
party resolution, like that provided by the ILO.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Organizing trade unions under military rule is an established right
under belligerent occupation. This right is found in customary interna-
tional law, both in the humanitarian law applicable to belligerent occupa-
tion and in the universally applicable human rights law. When either the
displaced sovereign or the occupant is a party to labor rights treaties,
these treaties are also applicable. Trade union rights during belligerent
occupation may be restricted only in extraordinary circumstances, but
may not be curtailed simply because of belligerent occupation.
This state of the law reflects the importance of the right to organize
157. Israel Targets Palestinian Instutions and Unions, supra note 155.
158. "PLO Fronts" Closed, Jerusalem Post (int'l ed.), week ending Sept. 3, 1988, at 1, col.
2. In 1989, an International Labor Organization report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip
stated that "influence by the army in the exercise of trade union activities has often taken place
in an indiscriminate and exaggerated manner without any account being taken of the genuine
trade union activity that exists." Report on the Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab
Territories, in 2 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL: APPENDICES, 76 INTERNATIONAL
LABOR CONF. 1, para. 69, at 34 (May 16, 1989).
1990]
266 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 13
trade unions. It suggests that trade union rights are to be protected
under all circumstances, even those that may seem inauspicious for their
effectuation.
